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Abstract: In Japan, technology spillovers have been less successful in the 
1990s than they were in the 1980s. One apparent reason for this is a decline in 
institutional flexibility - the ability of organisations to absorb technology, 
transform human capital and adapt to changing global conditions. Information 
and communication technology (JCT) has become embedded in US business 
practice, but Japanese firms have yet to absorb JCT or respond to human capital 
needs. This lack of flexibility has had a significant negative impact on the 
vitality of the Japanese economy. Section 2 of this paper will demonstrate 
recent changes in Japan's institutional flexibility by contrasting technology 
spillovers of the 1970s and 80s with those of the 1990s, linking this 
institutional flexibility with R&D diversification and showing the negative 
impact on Total Factor Productivity and GDP. This analysis was performed 
using data compiled by the Tokyo Institute of Technology as well as data from 
recent surveys conducted by a number of Japanese government offices and 
agencies. Section 2 will also discuss Japan's 'dual economy' by looking at key 
differences between Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and Large 
Enterprises (LEs) in terms of labour rigidity and ICT penetration. These 
differences are one aspect of institutional flexibility. Section 3 starts by 
comparing the economic growth rates in Japan and the USA in the second part 
of the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s. A comparison of labour, capital, 
material and Total Factor Productivity indicates a decline in flexibility in Japan 
and an increase in flexibility in the USA. Additionally, this reversal can be seen 
in technology, labour and capital substitution. Section 4 discusses key changes 
in the US and Japanese organisational environments as they converge on 
different digital platforms and implications for their respective institutions. Key 
questions are raised regarding often over-simplified fundamental changes 
purported in the USA. In this regard, the truly ' innovative' nature of SMEs in 
the USA is questioned as institutional rigidity in this sector grows. Section 5 
summarises final implications of this analysis and directs future work towards 
questions arising from this study. 
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information technology; Japan; USA. 
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1 Introduction 
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At the beginning of the 21st century, firms of all sizes, from giants to start-ups, are 
scrambling to ascertain how to leverage information and communications technology 
(ICT) to enhance business practice. Increasingly, this issue is a strategic national concern 
as governments struggle with maximising domestic potential for absorbing and utilising 
these technologies [1-3]. Of particular interest is facilitating technology spillover, or the 
seemingly natural flow of technology, particularly JCT, across industries and within 
industry sectors [4,5]. In this context, this analysis will examine institutional flexibility in 
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the two largest economies as a primary mechanism linked to technology spillover that 
enhances production. 
The US and Japanese economies are highly interdependent [1,6]. Furthermore, both 
have been highly scrutinised in detail over the last half-century with respect to structural 
changes and fundamental differences [6-8]. In addition, other analyses have examined 
ICT penetration in the two economies [9-11). However, the linkages between technology 
spillover and institutional elasticity have not been explored. Since the Asian economic 
crisis, keen observers have noted the critical role played by institutional gaps in the 
events that unfolded [12-15]. In particular, these works have shown that in East Asia, 
there has been a compression of economic development over two to three decades which 
took Europe more than a century to achieve. However, as these economies become 
locked into the global economic system, their economic institutions became subject to 
global pressures and standards [12]. Sometimes this resulted in mismatches between 
existing economic systems and institutions with the rapidly expanding and changing 
domestic markets of the 1990s. Furthermore, these mismatches arose from domestic 
economic institutions that were not commensurate with domestic political and social 
institutions. One major reason for this is that domestic political and social institutions are 
governed more by local rather than global pressures [12). Thus, there exist institutional 
gaps. Similarly, Japan has compressed development into a few decades, yet the 
institutional consequences of this compressed development remain unexplored. This 
analysis will show that institutional flexibility is critical for technology spillovers and 
essential for sustainable strategic advantage. In other words, the ability to enhance 
production processes continuously depends on bow institutions respond and adapt to 
changes, incorporating new labour and technology streams. Furthermore, the shifts 
indicated are related to technology spillovers and labour. 
Both the USA and Japan have levels of institutional elasticity that have varied over 
time. For example, during the Meiji period, Japan's institutions were elastic enough to 
accommodate tremendous change both economically and socially as it opened to trade 
with the West [16). However, these institutions became very inflexible during the 1930s 
but, following World War II, they demonstrated tremendous elasticity in absorbing 
technology and providing the foundation for economic development. The USA has 
demonstrated similar 'waves' of elasticity over the past century most recently during the 
economic struggles of the 1980s where institutions had to become flexible in order to 
remain competitive, adopting new strategies (such as J1T) and new technologies. In this 
regard, technology spillovers are a proxy for flexibility [ 17-19]. They demonstrate at the 
institutional level the capacity to absorb and assimilate new ideas and tools. 
This work will demonstrate that, in Japan, technology spillovers were successful in 
the 1980s but this capacity changed during the 1990s. Consequently, the difficulties in 
rejuvenating the Japanese economy are critically related to the capacity firms have for 
flexibly adjusting to changing global conditions. Furthermore, this flexibility is a function 
of a firm's ability to assimilate technology spillovers. This analysis will also suggest that 
this institutional flexibility has allowed ICTs to become embedded in US business 
practice throughout the 1990s, but the current trend is that institutions are becoming more 
rigid as processes and technology become more standardised and embedded. Section 2 
will demonstrate key changes in Japan's institutional flexibility by contrasting the 1970s 
and 1980s with the 1990s in terms of technology spillovers, linking this institutional 
flexibility with R&D diversification and showing the negative impact on Total Factor 
Productivity and GDP. Further support for this institutional trend will be demonstrated in 
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the substitution of technology for labour. This analysis was performed using data 
compiled by the Tokyo Institute of Technology as well as data from recent surveys 
conducted by a number of Japanese government offices and agencies. Section 2 will also 
discuss Japan's 'dual economy' by looking at key differences between Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and Large Enterprises (LEs) in terms of Labour 
rigidity and ICT penetration. This part of the analysis will show that institutional 
flexibility is a key component of challenges faced in the so-called 'dual economy.' 
Section 3 starts by comparing the economic growth rate in Japan and the USA in the 
second part of the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s showing that there was a reversal 
of fortunes comparing labour, capital, material and Total Factor Productivity. 
Additionally, this reversal can be seen in technology, labour and capital substitution. The 
issue of organisational change in the USA versus Japan is addressed in Section 4. This 
section discusses key changes in US and Japanese organisational environments as they 
converge on different digital platforms. Key questions are raised regarding often over-
simplified fundamental changes purported in the USA. In this regard, the truly 
'innovative' nature of SMEs is questioned. Section 5 summarises final implications of 
this analysis and directs future work towards questions arising from this study with 
respect to strategic national decisions and sustainable competitive advantage at the firm 
level. 
2 Technology spillovers and key changes in Japan's institutional flexibility 
2.1 The correlation between economic decline and R&D diversification in 
Japan 
Previous work has demonstrated the relationship between a firm's R&D investment, scale 
of production, R&D investment conditions and external shocks in the Japanese economy 
[18,20]. These studies demonstrated that a firm's R&D investment level is also governed 
by the level of maturity in the sector to which the firm belongs and subsequent state of 
the competitiveness of the sector [21]. An important point discussed in this body of 
literature is the interdependence of the firms and industry sectors involved. Given this 
mutual interdependence, the structural correlation between R&D investment level, 
diversification of R&D 'objects' (or objectives), technology spillover, TFP growth and 
subsequent production growth play a critical role in finns' R&D investments. 
Figure 1 illustrates trends in R&D investment and the ratio of the diversification of 
R&D in major sectors of the Japanese manufacturing industry over the period 1970-1995. 
It is generally observed that Japan's manufacturing industry's vigorous R&D activities 
remained competitive by diversifying its R&D 'objects' or focuses and that this effort at 
diversification decreased as R&D stagnated due to the bursting of the bubble economy. 
This is an example of firms increasing their flexibility. Figure 1 demonstrates this 
behaviour in the manufacturing industry and suggests equation (1 ), which indicates that 
the diversification ratio of R&D objectives can be a function of the level of R&D 
investment. 
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Figure 1 Trends in R&D investment and the ratio of the diversification ofR&D 'objects' in 
major sectors of the Japanese manufacturing industry (1970-1995) 
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(1) 
where R; : R&D investment in sector i; Ry : sector i R&D investment with field j R&D 
"R. 
objectives; L., _.I!_: diversification ratio of sector i. 
j R; 
This diversification of R&D objectives postulates a concept of technology distance 
between sector i and j (Py) as indicated in equation (2), which indicates a degree of 
mutual technology dependency between two sectors (as distance becomes shorter the 
mutual technology dependence becomes weaker). 
(2) 
Technology distance inevitably provides a significant impact on the spillover of 
technology from sector j to sector i ([R;]j) as indicated in equation (3). 
(3) 
This technology spillover, similar to R&D intensity, contributes to an increase in TFP as 
indicated in equation (3). 
t,.TFP =d.+ of;. R; + oYj. [R;]j 
TFP oI; Y; oTj 1'i (4) 
The TFP increase contributes to production increase as indicated in equation (5). 
(5) 
Increased production, together with R&D intensity, contributes to an increase in R&D 
investment as indicated in equation (6). 
1:,.%_ =/:,.(%) /(%)+~ (6) 
This increase in R&D investment again stimulates diversification in R&D objectives or 
'objects' which makes technology distance longer (making the mutual interdependence 
stronger) catalysing more technology spillover as indicated in equations (1), (2) and (3). 
These equations suggest a structural correlation between R&D investment level, 
diversification of R&D, technology spillover, TFP growth and subsequently production 
growth and the next level of R&D investment. Furthermore, this mutually reinforcing 
cycle requires a great deal of institutional flexibility in order for the diversification 
process to continue and for new technologies to be created and absorbed. However, in an 
adverse economic environment, this cycle changes as firms become more focused and 
rigid in order to cut costs and remain competitive. The problem is that this rigidity 
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eventually erodes their competitive base. Other details that demonstrate this institutional 
rigidity such as the immutability of the labour force will be discussed in greater detail 
later in this section. However, before looking at these other issues, we will examine the 
implications of the mathematical relationships defined more carefully using empirical 
data from Japan's manufacturing sector. 
Figure 2 indicates that technology distances between major industrial sectors and 
sectors with close interdependencies become shorter (mutual interdependencies became 
weaker) after the bursting of the bubble economy, which started in 1991 in the Japanese 
manufacturing industry. As indicated in equation (3), this weakening trend inevitably 
results in a stagnation of technology spillover. Figure 2 also demonstrates this stagnation 
in the Japanese manufacturing industry. Equation (4) provides a warning that this 
stagnation in technology spillover inevitably decreases TFP growth. Figure 3, which 
analyses the sources of the decreasing trends in TFP in the Japanese manufacturing 
industry, clearly demonstrates that the decrease in technology spillover was among the 
major sources of TFP decrease. Furthermore, as indicated in equation (5), the TFP 
decrease results in a production decrease. Figure 4 demonstrates a production decrease in 
the period after the bursting of the bubble economy. Finally, a production decrease 
inevitably results in a decrease in R&D investment as indicated in equation (6). Figure 5 
demonstrates that a dramatic decrease in R&D investment in the Japanese manufacturing 
industry after the bursting of the bubble economy was largely due to a decrease in 
production. A decrease in R&D investment again stagnates diversification of R&D 
resulting in a stagnation of technology spillover. Stagnation of technology spillover again 
stagnates TFP growth resulting in the stagnation of growth and the succeeding R&D 
investment breaking down into a 'vicious cycle' . At the core of this 'vicious cycle' is 
growing institutional 'rigidity.' As firms scale down, they lose their ability to respond 
and adapt to changes. As this flexibility is lost, it becomes more and more difficult for 
them to compete. 
2.2 Technology spillover and labour rigidity 
While this cycle may seem simple, it is in fact extremely complex, particularly as we 
consider the question of labour. Prior to this breakdown, Japan's sustainable post-war 
growth continued despite labour constraints. So, in terms of flexibility, how did Japan 
deal with these constraints prior to the 1990s in order to achieve such explosive growth 
during the 1970s and 1980s? A large body of literature has examined this question from 
the perspective of technology substitution for constrained production factors, particularly 
in the energy area [20,22]. As a result of these efforts, labour saving and automation 
facilities and technologies were developed and introduced broadly throughout Japan's 
manufacturing industry during the 1960s, 70s and 80s [20] . However, the previous 
analysis suggests that this cycle, which coincides with technology spillover flexibility, is 
rather fragile, similar to an ecosystem. Once the cycle starts to breaks down, substitution 
of technology for labour becomes extremely difficult as the technology resources become 
more and more restricted. Furthermore, institutions no longer have the capacity to fill the 
gaps needed in the labour force if appropriate industry-university linkages are not there to 
fill this decline in resources or if the labour that exists is unable to fill the gaps in the 
changing economic dynamics. In other words, if the labour force is rigidly constructed to 
fit a specific 'mould' and perform certain skills with the expectation that technology will 
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overcome labour constraints, once technology is not available to do this, the labour force 
does not have the flexibility to adapt to new business requirements. In this regard, 
Japan's 'dual economy' accounts for some of Japan's labour inflexibility. 
Figure 2 Trends in technology distances (1985-1995) and technology spillover (1970-1994) in 
major sectors of the Japanese manufacturing industry 
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Figure 3 Factors contributing to change in TFP in the Japanese manufacturing industry 
( 1980-1995) 
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Figure4 Trends in factors contributing to change in GDP in the Japanese manufacturing industry 
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Figure 5 Trends in factors and their magnitude contributing to a change in R&D investment in 
the Japanese manufacturing industry 
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2.3 Japan's dual economy and its transformation 
The previous analysis has focused on the shift that took place in the late 1980s and early 
1990s in order to demonstrate that a transition occurred in technology spillovers. 
Furthermore, the contributing factors to this transition were identified. A closer look at 
the more recent trends adds to our understanding of the institutional situation in Japan, 
particularly with respect to the flexibility oflabour. 
In the process of Japan's post-war recovery and subsequent explosive grov.rt:h, a gap 
emerged between SMEs and larger firms in terms of productivity, wages, technology and 
financing resulting in what is commonly referred to as Japan's 'dual economy.' This 
theory purports that, in general, Japan's SMEs are weak, due to a number of factors 
including excessively small firms, lack of diversity amongst the small firms and a less 
productive use or absence of technology in this critical area. Among reasons for this dual 
economy was that the Japanese educational system, particularly tertiary education, 
focused on producing graduates who would be retrained by the larger firms or 
government offices [23-26] rather than being trained at universities with adaptive skills 
capable of dealing with changes in the economic environment. This inflexibility is 
generally evident in a weak SME segment since most graduates are pulled to larger 
companies_ 
While this growing inelasticity was evident during the 1980s with a crescendo in the 
1990s, recent data indicates that some of these factors may be changing. Furthermore, 
these changes fit with the theory described in this analysis of cyclical rigidity and 
flexibility. For example, measurements of the size of the Japanese workforce show that 
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smaller business establishments are getting larger and that larger enterprises are 
downsizing (Figure 6). Further evidence indicates that SMEs are getting stronger as 
companies 'spin off operations and that SMEs are becoming more stable than their 
larger counterparts (Figure 7). These trends seem to suggest that Japanese SMEs are 
becoming more flexible and competitive as they become capable of absorbing labour and 
technology. However, there still appear to be significant barriers to achieving flexibility 
in the workforce. 
Figure 6 Changes in average workforce size of business establishments 
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Figure 7 Downsizing of business corporations 
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2.3.1 Changing lifestyles and institutional flexibility 
757 
100% 
Recent data from the Prime Minister's Office National Survey of the Young shows that 
33% of Japanese young adults between the ages of 18-24 have changed jobs, a much 
smaller proportion than in other countries (Figure 8). This figure suggests that the 
Japanese labour market is highly inflexible and this is generally thought to be due to the 
persistence of seniority-based pay and long-term employment practices that both allow 
and encourage salaried workers hired after graduation from universities to remain at the 
same firm until retirement. This attitude is slowly changing. A comparison of surveys of 
attitudes toward changing employment carried out in 1987 and 1999 reveals that the 
number of people agreeing that 'it is better to work as long as possible at the same 
company even if dissatisfied' has decreased while those responding that 'it is OK to 
change jobs if it allows one to make better use of one's abilities' has increased (Figure 9). 
This change in the labour market offers the growing SME segment of the Japanese 
economy the opportunity to attract more highly qualified, adaptive personnel. In addition, 
changing attitudes toward leisure time and a less predictable consumer durables market 
have shifted priority (Figure 10). The shift in priorities in these areas is forcing 
institutions to become more flexible in their capacity to meet marketplace demand 
because the consumer durables market is less predictable. Smaller businesses are ideal for 
navigating these constraints providing a more flexible atmosphere for workers, 
accommodating changes in the workforce and responding more quickly to consumer 
demand. As indicated earlier in Figures 6 and 7, shifts in this direction are occurring. 
However, obstacles remain. 
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Figure 8 International comparison of% of persons, 18-24 who have changed jobs 
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Figure 9 Shifting attitudes toward changing jobs 
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Figure 10 Changes in lifestyle priorities (1975-1999) 
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2.3.2 Institutional 'inflexibility' indicated by low IT penetration in SMEs 
Even though there are indications that SMEs are becoming more flexible than their larger 
counterparts, there is not yet any evidence, which shows that across industries Japan's 
SMEs are fully talcing advantage of their capacity to be more flexible. This is particularly 
evident when it comes to technology assimilation and R&D. 
In fact, there is some indication that technologically, Japan's SMEs are disadvantaged 
[9]. Previous studies indicate that there is a strong correlation between company size and 
IT penetration in Japan. In particular there is a strong correlation between company size 
and IT expenditure as well as the number of large enterprises in an industrial sector and 
the level of IT investment per company. The result is that IT penetration in SMEs is very 
small, further enhancing the 'digital divide' amidst the dual economy of Japan' s small 
and large enterprises. 
More recent data support this trend. An examination of the extent of the use of 
computers at firms by workforce size reveals that a large proportion of SMEs, 
particularly those with fewer than 20 employees have not yet introduced computers 
(Figure 11). Use of computers is, however, widespread among SMEs whose profits are 
growing (Figure 12) indicating that information systems in Japan are just as much a 
critical success factor as they are elsewhere. Overall, this indicates that institutional 
flexibility in incorporating IT at the SME level is important but still struggling in Japan. 
Therefore, Figures 11 and 12 in combination indicate that while institutional flexibility is 
important, at this point in time it is still lacking in Japan. Is there a pattern where 
institutions ebb and flow in their flexibility as suggested by Japan's ebb and flow over the 
last century? Furthermore, how does this ebb and flow ' sync' with other economies? 
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Figure 11 State of use of computers in business (by workforce size) 
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Figure 12 Use of computers and changes in profits (SMEs) 
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3 Contrast between Japan and the USA in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
If we compare the econormc growth rate and the factors supporting it in the USA and 
Japan for the second halfof the 1980s and the first halfof the 1990s it is clearly observed 
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that the situation reversed itself dramatically (Figure 13). In the latter part of the 1980s 
Japan enjoyed the bubble economy and the Japanese manufacturing industry's growth 
rate was much higher than similar growth in the US manufacturing industry. However, 
the tables were turned in favour of the USA in the 1990s. Japan's bubble economy burst 
in 1991 leading to an economic stagnation. Contrary to Japan's stagnation, the US 
economy started to enjoy growth without inflation. Figure 13 demonstrates this contrast 
also indicting that the US success from 1992 can largely be attributed to TFP growth. The 
question is can this growth also be attributed to the institutional flexibility between 
Jabour, capital and technology observed in Japan during previous decades? 
In order to investigate this, a translog cost function was developed for both the 
manufacturing industry in the USA and Japan over the last two decades (Table 1 ). Then a 
comparative analysis of the substitution mechanism between capital, labour and 
technology was conducted. The results are summarised in Figure 14. This Figure shows 
that similar trends can also be observed in such standard sectors as general machinery in 
both countries. These results indicate that the relationship between capital and labour in 
both countries was consistently substituted over the whole period. Furthermore, 
technology and capital were complementary in both countries. While the degree of the 
complementarity continued to decrease slightly in both countries in the 1980s, the 
complementarity in the USA changed to a dramatic increase from the early part of the 
1990s as institutions gained flexibility in substituting and trading off factors. In addition, 
technology and Jabour were strongly substituted for one another in both countries. While 
the degree of the substitution continued to decrease slightly in both countries in the 
1980s, substitution in the USA dramatically increased from the early part of the 1990s. 
These analyses indicate that institutional changes took place in Japan post-war and 
similarly changes took place in the USA during the 1990s. How do we characterise these 
changes except to see that there has been some shift in institutional flexibility? Do the 
institutions and infrastructures converge or diverge? 
Figure 13 Balance of econorrric growth rate and contribution factors in Japan and the US 
manufacturing industry (1985-1994) 
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Table 1 Estimated translog cost function for the Japanese and US manufacturing industries 
Japan (1975-1994) 
M, = 0.215 + 0.4971og(p1 I Pn) + 0.491 log (p1 I pJ - 0.021 log(p, I p0) + 0.1421og(p, I p0) 
(88.80) (7.74) (9.71) (-16.0) (20.4) 
R2 = 0.771 DW 0.44 
M2 = 0.146 + 0.4911og(p1 I pJ + 0.52llog (p1 I p0)- 0.3271og(p1 I pJ- 0.7481og(p, I pJ 
(79.10) (9.17) (7.82) (-1.43) (4.94) 
R2 = 0.770 DW 0.39 
M3 = 0.022 - 0.021 log(p, I pJ - 0.0031og (p1 I p0 ) + 0.1861og(p1 I p0 ) - 0.002(p, I pJ 
(44.30) (-16.0) (-1.43) (17.3) (-4.54) 
R2 = 0.952 DW 0.39 
M4 = 0.256 + 0.1421og(p, I p0) - 0. 7481og (p, I Pn) - 0.003(p1 I pJ + 0.086(p1 I Pn) 
(11.80)(20.4) (-4.94) (-4.54) (12.6) 
R2 = 0.990 DW 0.69 
USA (1965 - 1994) 
M1 = 0.174 - 0.1051og(p1 I Pn) + 0.0741og (p, I pJ- 0.0041og(p1 I pJ + 0.5241og(p1 I Pn) 
(74.90) (-3 .83) (3.54) (-1.52) (10.20) 
R2 = 0.748 DW 0.35 
M2 = 0.282 + 0.7421og(p1 I pJ + 0.1161og (p, I pJ- 0.009log(p1 I Pn)- 0.032log(p1 I pJ 
(13.60) (3.54) (5.73) (-3.59) (-6.65) 
R2 = 0.8201 DW 0.14 
M3=0.0189 - 0.0041og(p, I pJ - 0.0861og (p, I pJ +O.Dl 31og(p, I Pn) - 0.004(p, I p0 ) 
(92.50) (-1.52) (-3.59) (16.10) (-6.47) 
R2 = 0.967 DW 0.79 
M4 = O.D28 + 0.052log(p, I pJ - 0.032log (p1 I Pn) - 0.004(p, I Pn) + 0.592(p, I p0) 
(49.40) (10.20) (-6.65) (-6.47) (4.17) 
R2 = 0.0539 DW 0.29 
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Figure 14 Trends in substitution and complementarity among capital, technology and labour in the 
Japanese and the US manufacturing industry (1975-1994) 
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4 Discussion: convergence and divergence in institutional elasticity 
I 
There seems to be key structural differences in the two economies, but are they 
converging along different paths institutionally, particularly with respect to the flexibility 
required in the new global digital economy? Since 1991, organisations in both countries 
have increasingly invested in and continue to use, internetworking technologies for 
exchanging e-mail, publishing online information, building intranets and extranets and 
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shifting some of their operational systems onto the internet. While Japan has been slower 
in making these changes amongst its domestic institutions, multinationals which have 
been doing global business are just as linked to global networks as their US competitors. 
The difference is in how 'internetworked' companies are within national borders as 
opposed to between them. While technologists focus on the technological infrastructure 
necessary to make this transformation possible (e.g. [27]) and economists focus on the 
relationships between technological investments and organisational, industrial and 
national performance (e.g. [28]), based on the previous analysis in. this investigation 
demonstrating the differences, these views of a digital economy are not sufficient. While 
a healthy economy and a dependable infrastructure are critical to ongoing effectiveness, 
technologies are not just 'click here' interfaces and 'plug and play' standards [27,29] and 
economies are more than just production functions and transaction costs. Technologies 
and economies are only meaningful because they are embedded in institutions composed 
of people in specific social and cultural contexts. Therefore, the complexities analysed in 
this paper indicate convergence toward institutional flexibility but divergence in the paths 
taken to reach these elastic institutions. In order to understand these simultaneous 
processes we will briefly discuss the divergence of infrastructures in Japan and the USA, 
some of the complexities in the US system which make the seemingly dynamic SME 
sector appear to be more 'absorptive' to technology spillovers and finally some issues of 
measurement which need to be clarified in future work. 
4.1 Divergent infrastructures and convergence upon different platforms 
One area of particular strength related to the internet is Japan's growing capabilities in 
mobile internet services [30]. While PC penetration is lower than in many OECD 
countries, mobile services are amongst the world's highest [9]. In contrast to the USA, 
where the digital economy still largely converges around the PC, in Japan the platform of 
choice for digital convergence is mobile communications. Largely due to Japan's 
adherence to popular formats such as Wireless Application Protocol and WideBand 
CDMA, some innovative companies such as Mobilephone Communications International 
(MCD are world leaders in developing internet content for digital phones [30]. This 
content is specifically designed to facilitate transmission and reception of web pages 
adapted for the smaller screens characteristic of mobile devices. While most content is 
still geared toward the 'seedier' side of the internet and not yet integrated into the larger, 
more legitimate business-to-business e-commerce environment, it has tremendous 
potential in these other e-commerce areas. 
Japan clearly outpaces the USA in the standardisation of the mobile phone market. 
The deregulatory cacophony driving low telecommunications prices and booms in certain 
economic sectors has tied the technology in the USA to personal computers rather than 
mobile phones (particularly in business-to-consumer e-commerce). In a sense, a certain 
rigiclity has set in as infrastructure converges on this platform. In contrast, the mobile 
platform is institutionally more fluid requiring a huge array of spillovers both 
technologically and in terms of human capital. Some issues related to these technology 
choices are cultural: Japan is a cash-driven society where credit card use is relatively 
small. This being the case, different structures for electronic business transactions are 
established. In the mobile communications market, as in the rest of the 
telecommunications market, payment for services is usually deducted from a designated 
bank account with advanced arrangements or paid monthly along with the phone bill. 
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This arrangement is significantly different from the US market where the transaction is 
made at the point-of-sale by credit card. Consequently, the structures in Japan lend 
themselves more easily to the provision of content driven services (easily facilitated by 
phone) rather than online purchases (more easily facilitated by PC). The dramatic growth 
in mobile communications in Japan bodes well for ongoing strengths in this technological 
area, particularly as mobile phone systems and services advance globally. Therefore, 
while some institutions remain inflexible, other key areas are emerging with built-in 
flexibility. Perhaps this is how the transition described in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
occurred institutionally. However, if SMEs are the 'root' of 'trees' that populate this 
techno-econornic ecosystem, then what is the current state ofSMEs in the USA? Are they 
as flexible as purported by the media or is there evidence of 'solidification' as this 
analysis might suggest? 
4.2 SA1Es in the USA 
New firms in the USA have played a significant role in fomenting innovation in 
information technology. A recent study by Greenwood and Jovanovic (29] shows that a 
group of 'IT upstarts' - firms specialising in computer and communications technologies 
that went public 20 years ago now account for over 4% of the total US equity market 
capitalisation. Whilst some of this growth has come at the expense of incumbent 
information technology firms, the new market value and technology spillovers created by 
these new businesses appear to be substantial [31]. Surprisingly, more and more research 
in the USA suggests that there appears to be a very weak relationship between firm size, 
the tendency to undertake R&D and the effectiveness of research spending [32,33]. That 
is, in aggregate, small businesses in the USA may not be particularly research-intensive 
or innovative or open to technology spillovers (very similar to the situation described in 
Japan). Nonetheless, there is a small sub-group of small businesses in the USA that do 
appear to excel at innovation, are highly R&D intensive and consequently very flexible 
institutionally. These businesses are all venture capital backed start-ups [32]. Therefore, 
in order to understand policy mechanisms for revitalising technology spillovers, SMEs 
and institutional elasticity, further investigations should analyse the key problems in 
financing these firms and the key mechanisms venture investors employ to guide the 
innovation process. In addition, more policy focus should be placed on ensuring 
technology and labour flows are healthy. 
5 Conclusions and future work 
This investigation first showed that diversification is the key to flexibility in terms of 
technology spillovers and that the post-1990s pattern in Japan has been declining. This 
capacity for technology spillover is linked to institutional gaps, particularly in the ability 
of the workforce to adjust to new business requirements. A prime example of this is the 
so-called 'dual economy', which highlights weaknesses in Japan's SMEs. Recent data 
shows that some of the institutional weaknesses are being rectified as Japan's SMEs grow 
in strength. However, there exists tremendous labour inflexibility, therefore institutional 
inflexibility. Workers are very reluctant to change jobs even if dissatisfied and are rarely 
trained to do so because of seniority and the life-time employment system. However, 
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shifts in priorities, particularly in young people, are forcing institutions to become more 
flexible. The issue of low penetration in SMEs of information technology is also a serious 
constraint keeping these institutions from filling the required gaps in the economy. This 
is still a source of institutional inflexibility. A comparison of the USA and Japan 
demonstrates the shifts in flexibility from the 1980s in Japan to the 1990s in the USA 
suggesting some institutional 'ebb and flow'. Finally, this work discusses the paradox of 
both countries converging and diverging institutionally at the same time, pointing out 
weaknesses and strengths in US SMEs. Measurements required to elucidate this paradox 
further are also discussed. Further study is required to answer key questions raised in 
elucidating the relationship between technology spillovers and internetworking, 
particularly as it impacts on organisational change: 
• What kinds of changes are taking place within and across organisations as they 
internetwork? 
• What is the range of work processes associated with interconnecting with customers, 
workers, partners, suppliers, etc.? 
• What kinds of new roles are emerging as organisations become less bounded and 
more open to external demands and interactions? 
Ultimately, this work suggests that policy makers must address technology spillovers as a 
critical success driver for sustainable strategic advantage. In this regard, tools for 
measuring and monitoring institutional flexibility in assimilating technology and human 
capital should be a key focus for enhancing strategic national decisions in techno-
economic development. 
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